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This paper analyzes the relevance of sectoral in￿ation persistence di￿erentials for optimal mon-
etary policy using a two-sector sticky price model, which generalizes the models existing in the
literature by introducing in￿ation persistence to both sectors. The results show that even if the
sectors have the same degree of in￿ation persistence, optimal in￿ation targeting policy attaches
di￿erent weights to these. In particular, di￿erent combinations of price change frequency and
backward looking price setting parameters can produce the same in￿ation persistence but have
di￿erent implications for the optimal in￿ation targeting policy. It is also shown that targeting
the in￿ation of the more persistent sector is not robust to di￿erent calibrations of parameters of
the price setting mechanism. However, optimal in￿ation targeting rule attaches a higher weight
to the in￿ation of the sector with a ￿atter Philips curve whether it is more persistent or not.
Having derived a central bank loss function as a second order Taylor approximation to the wel-
fare, I show that the optimal in￿ation targeting rule fails to approximate the optimal policy
when sectoral in￿ations are persistent and the welfare loss increases as the in￿ation persistence
di￿erential across sectors increases.
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The existence of heterogeneity in in￿ation persistence across sectors is well documented. 1
This evidence has important implications for monetary policy. Understanding sectoral
responses to monetary policy shocks can be helpful in explaining the mechanism through
which monetary policy a￿ects the real economy. 2 Moreover, the heterogeneity across
sectors determines the way monetary policy should be designed since the hands of the
policy makers are tied with a single policy instrument to control for the developments
in di￿erent sectors. Under an in￿ation targeting regime the particular question is how
the existence of di￿erent degrees of in￿ation inertia across sectors a￿ects the design of
the target in￿ation measure. That is, which measure of in￿ation should the central bank
target? This paper answers that question in a very general two sector framework.
Sectoral di￿erences in ￿rms’ price setting mechanisms is generally thought of as the source
of the heterogeneity in in￿ation persistence. The relevance of heterogeneity in price setting
mechanism is analyzed before by assuming di￿erent price change frequencies for di￿erent
sectors. Aoki (2001) employs a model with one ￿exible and one sticky price sector and
shows that optimal policy is to stabilize a core in￿ation measure given by the in￿ation of
the sticky price sector. Benigno (2004) introduces sluggish price adjustment ￿ la Calvo
into both sectors and argues that optimal in￿ation targeting policy is to attach higher
weight to the in￿ation of the sector that is constrained by a lower frequency of price
change.3 Lower frequency of price change also implies a ￿atter New Keynesian Philips
curve (NKPC). Thus, the higher is the ability of the sectoral in￿ation to adjust to the
e￿cient ￿uctuations in the output gap, the smaller is the weight attached to its in￿ation.
Note that these models imply purely forward looking NKPC and produce front-loaded
1For univariate analysis see, among many others, Aucramanne and Collin (2005), Altissimo, Mojon
and Za￿aroni (2007), Bilke (2004), L￿nnemann and Math￿ (2004).
2See Carvalho (2005) and Barsky et al. (2007).
3Note that the analysis of the optimal monetary policy under a currency union with heterogeneous
regions and in a single country with heterogeneous sectors is analogous. The only di￿erence is that what
is called terms of trade in the two region model corresponds to a relative price in the two sector model.
1impulse responses. Thus, as suggested by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Fuhrer and Moore
(1995) for single sector models, they do not capture the persistence of in￿ation observed
in the data. An exception to this is Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) who develop a
two-sector sticky-price model with a single sector displaying in￿ation persistence. The
persistence in that sector is modeled by introducing a type of producers who set their
prices according to a rule-of-thumb consistent with a similar single sector model of Gali
and Gertler (1999).4 Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) concludes that it is optimal to
target the in￿ation of the sector that is persistent. Noting that the persistence in the
purely forward looking sector is zero, Levin and Moessner (2005) argue that result of Be-
nigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) can be interpreted as targeting the in￿ation of the sector
that has higher degree of in￿ation persistence. Therefore, the main concern of this paper
is that whether targeting the in￿ation of the more persistent sector is a robust policy
implication in a generalized model.
In this paper, I extend the analysis to take account of sectoral di￿erences in in￿ation
persistence by assuming backward looking price setters for both sectors. That is, dif-
ferent than the ones implied by standard models, the NKPC of each sector links the
current in￿ation to that of the previous period as well as to expected in￿ation and the
output gap.5 Although evidence suggests that all sectors are characterized by hybrid price
setting with di￿erent mechanisms, currently there exists no study allowing for in￿ation
persistence for both sectors and conducting analysis for di￿erent feasible values of the price
setting parameters. Thus, one of the goals of this paper is to ￿ll this hole in the literature.
First, the implications of the equal degree of in￿ation persistence across sectors is analyzed.
An equal degree of in￿ation persistence can be produced with di￿erent combinations of
4In an earlier version Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) propose an approximate nominal rigidity
measure for the hybrid price setting sector and suggest that when this measure implies the same degree
of nominal rigidity across sectors, optimal in￿ation targeting policy is targeting the CPI in￿ation. For
feasible calibrations, K￿sem-Alp (2009) shows that targeting CPI in￿ation on the basis of equivalence of
this measure across sectors implies signi￿cant welfare loss.
5Leith and Malley (2005) and Massidda (2005) shows that the coe￿cient of the lagged in￿ation in the
NKPC is signi￿cant and di￿erent across sectors and that this heterogeneity arises from di￿erent price
change frequencies and di￿erent fractions of backward indexing producers.
2frequency of price change and fraction of backward looking price setters. This analysis
is done in order to understand whether homogeneity in degree of in￿ation persistence
can be a summary statistic and help the central bank avoid considering the underlying
sectoral heterogeneities. If so, equal persistence across sectoral in￿ations would imply the
optimality of the CPI targeting. Results, however, show that CPI targeting is optimal
only if the sectors have exactly the same price setting mechanisms.
Next, the relevance of the higher persistence in one sector for optimal in￿ation targeting
is studied by calibrating one of the sectors to be more persistent than the other. These
results show that targeting the in￿ation of the sector that is more persistent is not a
parameter robust policy and for some parameter combinations it is optimal to target the
in￿ation of the less persistent sector. Moreover, I ￿nd that optimal weights are deter-
mined according to the relative slope of the NKPC of the sectors, rather than the relative
persistence across sectors. That is, as the in￿ation of a sector becomes less elastic to the
changes in the output gap, the weight attached to the in￿ation of that sector increases
whether its in￿ation is more persistent than that of the other sector or not. Thus, the
result of Benigno (2004) carries over to the models with backward looking price setters
and it is the slope of the NKPC rather than the in￿ation persistence, that matters for the
optimal in￿ation targeting policy.
As far as welfare implications of in￿ation targeting are concerned, as shown by Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998), in single sector models without in￿ation persistence in￿ation
targeting policy coincides with the optimal policy. In￿ation targeting policy still approx-
imates the optimal policy in a two sector environment unless the in￿ations of the sectors
are persistent.6 However, when in￿ation persistence is introduced the optimal in￿ation
targeting policy fails to approximate the optimal policy. For some parameter combina-
tions, optimal in￿ation targeting rule implies a welfare loss almost twice as high as that
of optimal commitment rule and exhibits signi￿cantly di￿erent impulse responses. Here
6See Eusepi et al.(2009)for a multi sector analysis.
3the welfare loss under each policy is computed according to a central bank loss function,
which is derived as a second order approximation to the social welfare. Moreover, a higher
level of in￿ation persistence in the economy as a whole implies a higher or lower additional
welfare loss depending on its source. I also ￿nd that the additional welfare loss implied
by optimal in￿ation targeting increases as the magnitude of the di￿erence between the
persistence of sectoral in￿ations increases. That is, the welfare loss is smallest when the
sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I describe the measure of
the in￿ation persistence used throughout the paper. Section 3 presents the model and
the utility based welfare function that policymakers seek to maximize. The emphasis will
be on how the existence of backward looking price-setters a￿ects this welfare function.
Section 4 shows the optimal in￿ation targeting rule under homogenous and heterogeneous
degrees of in￿ation persistence across sectors. Section 5 displays the welfare implications
of adopting optimal in￿ation targeting instead of the optimal commitment policy and
impulse response analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring the In￿ation Persistence
Aggregate or disaggregated in￿ation persistence is usually computed under univariate
models by summing the autoregressive coe￿cients. Under this reduced form analysis the
sources behind the in￿ation persistence are not clear. Thus for disaggregated series, the
source of heterogeneity is not obvious. Angeloni et al. (2004) address this issue and
distinguish the possible sources of in￿ation persistence by employing a hybrid NKPC of
the following form:
t = 1(yt   y
n
t ) + 2t 1 + 3t+1 + ut
where t is in￿ation and (yt yn
t ) is output gap. Intrinsic persistence is given by 2, which
measures the dependence on past in￿ation due to the price setting mechanism. 7
7Levin and Moessner (2005) show that as the degree of endogenous persistence increases, the reduced
form measure of in￿ation, the serial correlation in in￿ation also increases.
4Since the focus of this paper is the heterogeneity in in￿ation persistence arising from the
existence of di￿erent price setting mechanisms across sectors, the measure of in￿ation
persistence used in this paper is 2.8 Following Levin and Moessner (2005), I compute
the serial correlations in sectoral in￿ations for di￿erent degrees of endogenous persistence
in sectoral in￿ations both under the optimal commitment policy and the simple Taylor
rule of the form:
it = 1:5t + 0:5(Yt   Y
n
t ) + et
Panels of Figure 1 display the di￿erence in serial correlations in in￿ation persistence
across sectors as a function of the di￿erence in degree of endogenous persistence. The
￿gure shows that the sector with a higher degree of endogenous persistence also has a
higher degree of reduced from in￿ation persistence and as the di￿erence in endogenous
persistence increases, the di￿erence in serial correlation in sectoral in￿ations increases.
Moreover, this ￿nding is robust not only to the choice of the monetary policy rule but
also to alternative calibrations of the sectoral price setting mechanisms, which will be
explained in detail in the following section. Therefore, within the set up of this paper, the
word intrinsic is redundant and I refer to the sector with a higher 2 as more persistent.
3 The Model
The model studied in this paper is a standard stochastic general equilibrium represen-
tative household model with two monopolistically competitive sectors. The sectors are
assumed to be of the same economic size. 9 Both sectors are characterized by sluggish price
adjustment and a fraction of producers in each sector are unsophisticated price setters,
who adjust their prices to according to a rule of thumb. In this paper, I generalize the
standard two sector models in the literature by introducing backward indexing producers
8In order to di￿erentiate the intrinsic in￿ation persistence from extrinsic persistence, the sources of
in￿ation persistence exogenous to the price setting, I calibrate the sectors with equally persistent supply
shocks.
9Alternative calibrations of the share in consumption or equivalently the economic size is also possible
and do not change the results.
5into both sectors.
3.1 Utility of a Representative Household
Each household consumes all of the di￿erentiated goods in both sectors, and produces a

















where u() represents the utility of consumption and v() represents the disutility of pro-
duction. I make the usual assumptions that u() is increasing and concave, and that v() is
increasing and convex. The constant 2(0,1) is the discount factor and the argument C
j
t,
which represents a CES index of representative household purchases of the di￿erentiated
































Here i 2 f1;2g indexes sectors. The elasticity of substitution between any two di￿eren-
tiated goods in each sector, , is assumed to be greater than unity and uniform across
sectors. The argument y
j
i;t is the output of the good that representative household j in
sector i produces. The household indexed by j produces one of the di￿erentiated goods
in sector i. Following Aoki (2001), I assume that the preference shock d
t is identical
across all households. I also assume that s
i;t= s
1;t for all households producing one of
the di￿erentiated goods of the ￿rst sector and s
i;t= s
2;t for all households producing one
of the di￿erentiated goods of the second sector, where d
t and s
i;t are stationary random
shocks. These assumptions imply that all of the producers in each sector face the same
supply shocks and that there is no sector speci￿c demand shock in this economy.
63.2 The Consumption Decision
The model assumes complete ￿nancial markets with no obstacles to borrowing against
future income, so that each household faces a single intertemporal budget constraint.
The model further assumes that households can insure one another against idiosyncratic
income risk. These assumptions imply that, if all households have identical initial wealth,
they will choose identical consumption plans. The optimal allocation for a given level of
nominal spending across all of the di￿erentiated goods of both sectors at time t leads to
the Dixit-Stiglitz demand relations as functions of relative prices. For the following, the
index j is suppressed, since the consumption decision is identical across all households.
The total expenditure required to obtain a given level of consumption index Ct is given




Here Pi;t is the price index of the sector i de￿ned below. I assume that the share of each
sectors’ composite good comprises the half of total consumption. Demand for the sectoral
composite di￿erentiated goods of sector i are the usual Dixit-Stiglitz demand relations as


















where pi;t(z) is the price of di￿erentiated good in sector i indexed as z at time t.


















where t is marginal utility of nominal income, which follows the rule of motion
t(1 + Rt) = t+1 (9)
with Rt the risk-free nominal interest rate at time t.
3.3 The Production Decision
It is assumed, as is standard in this literature, that prices in both sticky-price sectors are
changed at exogenous random intervals in the fashion of Calvo (1983). The producers in
each sector can change their prices with a constant probability 1 i. A fraction 1  i of
the households who can change their prices behave optimally when making their pricing
decisions. I refer to these producers as the forward-looking households. The remaining
producers, a fraction  i, instead use a simple backward-looking rule-of-thumb when set-
ting their prices. I refer to these producers as the backward-looking producers.
Given the complete markets and symmetric initial steady state assumptions, all forward-
looking producers that are able to adjust their price at date t, will choose the same price.
Let P
f
i;t denote this price. I assume that all backward-looking producers who change their
price at date t also set the same price. Let P b
i;t denote this price.
The forward looking producer who is able to choose his price in period t chooses P
f
i;t to













8First term is the expected revenue in utility terms. Since the cost of production is in
terms of utility, the revenue is multiplied by the marginal utility of income. Maximizing
the objective function with respect to P
f



































is interpreted as the nominal marginal cost of sector i. Since the household is both worker
and the owner of the ￿rm in sector i, the cost of production is the disutility resulting from
working.
As in Gali and Gertler (1999), I assume that the backward-looking ￿rms set their prices






where i;t 1=pi;t 1=pi;t 2 and P 










According to equation (14) the backward looking ￿rms adjust their prices to equal the
geometric mean of the prices that they saw chosen in the previous period, P 
i;t 1, adjusted
for the sectoral in￿ation rate they observed in the previous period, i;t 1. That is, these
￿rms use the in￿ation observed in the previous period a proxy for that of the current pe-
riod. This way of price setting, while not optimal, keeps their relative prices same across
periods when in￿ation is constant, for example at steady state.
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Each period, a fraction i of the producers keeps charging the price of the previous period.
The remaining 1   i of the ￿rms change their prices but only 1    i of them choose the
optimal price and the remaining producers set their prices according to the rule of thumb.
Unsophisticated price setters are introduced into both sectors because standard New Key-
nesian models with purely forward looking price setting mechanisms fail to explain the
hump shaped responses of sectoral in￿ations to demand and supply shocks. Introducing
this type of backward looking behavior helps to alleviate this problem.
3.4 Log-linearization of the Model
In this paper, the equations of the model, which is a general form of the model used by
Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006), are a quite complicated system of stochastic non-linear
di￿erence equations. I log-linearize the model around its steady state with zero in￿ation
and study the dynamics of this approximate model.
The relative price charged at time t by ￿rms with new prices of di￿erentiated goods in
sector i is denoted by xk
i;t = pk
i;t=Pi;t, k=f for price set by forward looking behavior and
k=b for price set according to rule of thumb. xi;t = Pi;t=Pt denotes the relative price of
each sector.
The log-linearized Euler conditions (9) and (10) imply the following IS curve 10
^ Yt = Et^ Yt+1   (rt   Et^ t+1   ^ 
d
t + Et^ 
d
t+1) (17)
10Variables with hats denote the percentage deviations from the steady state.
10The NKPC of the sector i is given by11
^ i;t = i1(^ Yi;t   ^ Y
n
i;t) + i2^ i;t 1 + i3^ i;t+1 + i4^ xi;t (18)
where
i1 =
(1   i)(! 1 +  1)(1   i)(1    i)
(1 + 
!)(i +  i(1   i + i))
i2 =
 i
i +  i(1   i + i)
i3 =
i
i +  i(1   i + i)
i4 =  
(1   i)(1 +  1)(1   i)(1    i)
(1 + 














The parameter ! is the elasticity with respect to output of the disutility of supplying
production, and  is the elasticity the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 12 ^ Y n
i;t rep-
resents a change in the natural rate of output in sector i, which is the level of supply that
keeps the real marginal cost in sector i constant at the ￿exible price level.
The measure of in￿ation persistence is the coe￿cient of the lagged in￿ations in the NKPC
of the sectors, i.e. 12 and 22. Note that when 12 is zero, the ￿rst sector does not display
in￿ation persistence and the model reduces to that of Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006).
Note that limi!1 i1 = 0, lim i!1 i1 = 0, limi!0 i1 =  i=(1  i) > 0 and lim i!0 i1 =
(1   i)(1   i)=1 > 0. Thus, as the frequency of price change decreases, i increases,
and the fraction of backward indexing producers increases, the NKPC becomes ￿atter
and sectoral in￿ation becomes less elastic to the changes in the output gap. In other
words, sectoral in￿ation fails to change inline with the e￿cient ￿uctuations in the output
11See Appendix A for the derivation.
12Here  =  u00dC=u0 and ! =  v00s
iYi=v0 for i = 1;2, evaluated at steady state. Following Aoki
(2001), ! is assumed to be uniform across sectors.
11gap. Notice also that limi!1 i2 =  i=(1 +  i) < 1, lim i!1 i2 = 1=(1 + i) > 0,
limi!0 i2 = 1 and lim i!0 i1 = 0. Therefore, the degree of persistence in a sector is
higher the higher the frequency of price change and the higher the fraction of backward
indexing producers. As higher frequency of price change and higher fraction of backward
indexing producers imply a higher total fraction of backward looking price setters given
by (1   ) .
3.5 The Loss Function
The central bank is concerned with maximizing the welfare of the households. Following
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999) and Woodford (2003, ch. 6), the welfare measure























Following Aoki (2001), I assume that mass of one households produce for each sector but
mass of two consumes each sectors’ product. Therefore, in equilibrium the consumption
of each good is the half of the production of that good. As in Aoki (2001) and Benigno
and Lopez-Salido (2006), I assume that this steady state involves a lump-sum tax, which
is set such that the steady state levels of output in both sectors are e￿cient.
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where Lt is the loss function and the coe￿cients are given by








































(1   2)(1    2)(1   2)
Notice that, when  1 = 0, the loss function simpli￿es to that of Benigno and Lopez-Salido
(2006), where central bank takes into account in￿ations of both sectors and change in the
in￿ation of the second sector only. The introduction of backward looking price setters
makes the deviation of the current in￿ation from in￿ation of the previous period a concern
of optimal policy, since the relative price of the backward looking price setters are dis-
torted as much as this deviation. Note that, as   increases the weight of the deviation of
this period’s in￿ation from that of the previous period, 5 or 6, increases. Therefore, for
a constant level of price change frequency, as the fraction of backward indexing producers
increases, the weights attributed to changes in in￿ation increases.
Note also that when  1 =  2 = 0 the loss function obtained is that of Aoki (2001)
and Benigno (2004). Since there exists no backward indexing producers in the economy,
deviation in in￿ation is not a concern of the central bank in itself. Moreover, since the
only parameter governing the nominal rigidity in a sector is , once it is equal across
sectors, the weights of the sectoral in￿ations is equal in the loss function. This clearly
implies attaching equal weights to sectoral in￿ations in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule. These equal weights can only be generated by equal frequency of price change across
sectors, which is the sole source of heterogeneity in price setting in the model. Therefore,
for purely forward looking models, the weights in the optimal in￿ation targeting rule is
0.5 if and only if  is the same across sectors.
133.6 Optimal In￿ation Targeting
The model is closed by introducing a strict in￿ation targeting rule, which has the following
form
1;t + (1   )2;t = 0 (22)
where  is the weight that is attributed to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector. The weight
is chosen to maximize the welfare criterion (19) subject to the structural equations of
the model ((17) and (18)). Once sectoral asymmetries are introduced, under the in￿a-
tion targeting regime, the concern of the central bank becomes which in￿ation to target.
Therefore, under the strict in￿ation targeting rule, the central bank de￿nes the optimal
basket, which is determined by optimally choosing the weights that should be attached
to each sector.
3.7 Model Calibration
The calibrations follow those of Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002). The discount rate  is
calibrated as 0.99. I set the parameter  equal to 6, which corresponds to a steady-state
mark-up of 1.2. The elasticity of substitution in consumption, , is 6 and the elasticity
of the disutility of producing the di￿erentiated goods, !, is 0.6. The average duration of
price, which is given by 1=(1   ), is calibrated alternatively as 3, 4, 5 and 6 quarters.
The fraction of rule of thumb price setters are assumed to be 0.01, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.8 as the
fraction of backward indexing producers are estimated to be less than 0.8 for each sector
in Massidda (2005) and Leith and Malley (2005). The sectors are assumed to be equal in
economic size. The asymmetric supply shocks and the symmetric demand shock follow
an AR(1) process of the kind:
Xt = Xt 1 + "t
where Xt is the vector of shock processes, Xt=(^ s
1;t; ^ s
2;t, ^ d
t),  is 0.9 and "t is the vector of
independently identi￿ed disturbances. The shocks ^ s
1;t; ^ s
2;t and ^ d
t have standard deviations
14of unity.
4 In￿ation Persistence and Optimal In￿ation Targeting
In this section I analyze the relevance of the in￿ation persistence for the optimal in￿ation
targeting policy for the two cases: sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence and
one of the sectors is more persistent than the other sector.
4.1 Homogenous Degrees of In￿ation Persistence across Sectors
I ￿rst calibrate the sectors with a uniform degree of in￿ation persistence and analyze the
relevance of the same reduced form dynamics for the optimal in￿ation targeting policy.
Therefore, the concern of this section is that whether the central bank can ignore the
underlying heterogeneities across sectors when they imply same degree of in￿ation per-
sistence and target the CPI in￿ation. Since in￿ation persistence is determined by the
two parameters of the price setting mechanism, it is possible to produce same degree of
in￿ation persistence with di￿erent combinations of frequency of price change and fraction
of backward looking price setters.
Table 1 displays the optimal weight attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector. First
column is the duration of prices in the second sector and second column is that of the
￿rst sector. For each calibration of the price setting parameters of the second sector and
the frequency of the price setting in the ￿rst sector, the fraction of backward indexing
producers in the ￿rst sector is computed consistent with calibrations of other parameters
so that the degree of in￿ation persistence of the ￿rst sector is equal to that of the second
sector. Note that, CPI targeting is optimal only if the sectors are characterized by exactly
the same price setting mechanism. That is, optimal weight is equal to the economic size
of each sector, 0.5, when they have the same frequency of price change and fraction of
backward looking price setters. When the sectors have heterogenous price setting mech-
anisms, the optimal weight takes values between 0.20 and 0.77. This implies that even if
15both sectors have the same degree of in￿ation persistence, the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule is not CPI targeting.
Since the degree of in￿ation persistence is the same across sectors, a higher duration of
price in one sector is accompanied with a higher fraction of backward looking price setters
than the other sector. Therefore, as the duration of price increases in the ￿rst sector, the
weight attached to its in￿ation increases.
4.2 Heterogenous Degrees of In￿ation Persistence across Sectors
The previous section analyzed whether the CPI in￿ation targeting is the optimal in￿ation
targeting rule under uniform calibration of the in￿ation persistence. It is shown that
even if the sectors have uniform degree of in￿ation persistence, the di￿erences in the price
setting mechanism should be considered when designing the optimal in￿ation targeting
measure. In this section the relevance of higher degree of in￿ation persistence in one
sector for optimal monetary policy is analyzed.
First note that persistence in one sector can be made higher than that of the other sector
by assuming a higher total fraction of the backward looking price setters in that sector,
namely (1   ) . Clearly, this can happen in many ways for di￿erent combinations of 
and  .
Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) show that for a constant fraction of backward indexing
producers, the weight attached to the in￿ation of the sector increases with the increase
in the duration of price. Similarly, keeping the duration of price constant, the weight of
the in￿ation of the sector increases as the fraction of backward price setters increases. In
this paper, the calibrations span all possible cases changing both parameters to ￿nd out
which e￿ect dominates.
For di￿erent feasible calibrations of the parameters of the price setting mechanisms of
16both sectors, the second sector is calibrated to be more persistent than the ￿rst sector
and the weights in the optimal in￿ation targeting rule are computed. The ￿rst panel of
Table 2 displays the optimal weights attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector when the
second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by 0.1 points. Since the weight in
the table is that of the less persistent sector, one would expect that it takes values less
than 0.5. However, results show that for some calibrations the optimal weight is higher
than the economic size of 0.5 and implies that central bank should pay higher attention
to the in￿ation of the less persistent sector. The weight attached to the in￿ation of the
￿rst sector decreases as the fraction of backward looking price setters in the second sector
increases.
The robustness of the result is checked by calibrating the in￿ation of the second sector
to be 0.3 points higher than that of the ￿rst sector. The optimal weights are reported
in the second panel of Table 2. Results show that for some of the parameter calibra-
tions, although the ￿rst sector is signi￿cantly less persistent than the ￿rst sector, a higher
weight is attributed to its in￿ation in the optimal in￿ation targeting rule. The di￿erence
between the ￿rst and second panels of Table 2 is that the weights in the second panel
are smaller than the corresponding weights in the ￿rst panel. That is, for 3 quarters of
duration of prices in both sectors and 0.3 of fraction of backward looking price setters
in the second sector, the weight attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector in ￿rst panel
is 0.461, whereas the corresponding weight in the second panel is 0.410. Therefore, as
the gap between the degree of persistence of the sectoral in￿ations increases, the weight
attached to the less persistent sector decreases.
Having shown that the optimal in￿ation targeting rule is not designed considering the
degree of in￿ation persistence, the next section explores whether the reason behind this
fact is the implications related to the slope of the NKPC.
174.3 Slope of the NKPC and Optimal In￿ation Targeting
As mentioned before, models without in￿ation persistence suggest that the central bank
should attribute a higher weight to the in￿ation of the sector with a higher duration of
price. This is equivalent to the suggestion that stabilization of the in￿ation of the sector
that has a ￿atter NKPC should be more of a concern for monetary policy. In the model
presented in this paper, the slope of the NKPC is not only a function of the frequency
of price change but also the fraction of backward looking price setters. Therefore, this
section addresses the question whether optimal in￿ation targeting policy is designed ac-
cording to the relative slope of the sectoral NKPCs in a generalized model.
Panels of Figure 2 display the optimal weights attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector
obtained in the previous sections as a function of the relative slope of the ￿rst sector when
the di￿erential in in￿ation persistence across sectors is 0, 0.1 and 0.3 points and fraction
of backward looking producers is 0.5. 14 The ￿rst panel shows that for a given duration
of prices in the second sector as the relative slope increases, the weight attached to the
in￿ation of the ￿rst sector decreases. Moreover, when the NKPC of the ￿rst sector is
￿atter than that of the second sector, the optimal weight attached to the in￿ation of it
is higher than 0.5. Similarly, when the NKPC of the ￿rst sector is steeper than that of
the second sector, a lower weight is attached to its in￿ation. The second and the third
panels of Figure 2 presents Therefore, the weight attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst
sector is a function of the slope of the NKPC but not that of the in￿ation persistence
per se. Even though the second sector is calibrated to be more persistent than the ￿rst
sector, unless it has a ￿atter NKPC, stabilization of its in￿ation becomes less of concern
for the central bank.15 As in the models without in￿ation persistence, it is optimal to pay
higher attention to the in￿ation of the sector that generates higher real distortions and
fails to adjust to the e￿cient ￿uctuations in the sectoral output gap.
14Relative slope is obtained by dividing the slope of the NKPC of the ￿rst sector to that of the second
sector.
15For some calibrations that are not reported here, the optimal weight is not equal across sectors when
they have NKPCs that have about the same slope, which can be produced by di￿erent price setting
mechanisms. Because of that the slope of the NKPC is not a su￿cient summary statistic for the optimal
in￿ation targeting policy design here, unlike in the case of models without in￿ation persistence.
185 Welfare Analysis
Two sector models of Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) and the multi-sector model of Eu-
sepi et al. (2009) imply that optimal in￿ation targeting policy approximates the optimal
commitment policy well. Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) shows that optimal in￿ation
targeting policy is outperformed by output gap targeting policy for some parameter cal-
ibrations. In the following subsections, I report the welfare cost of adopting in￿ation
targeting policy instead of the optimal policy for the two cases where the sectors have
same degree of in￿ation persistence and one of the sectors is more persistent than the
other sector. Combining the results, I analyze the relevance of the level of in￿ation per-
sistence in the economy and the magnitude of the di￿erence in in￿ation persistence across
sectors for welfare.
5.1 Welfare Analysis under Homogenous Degrees of In￿ation Per-
sistence across Sectors
For each calibration of the optimal in￿ation targeting rule in the previous section, Table
1(b) shows the welfare cost of in￿ation targeting policy instead of optimal policy when
sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence. The welfare measure is the extra loss as
a percentage of optimal loss which is given by the expression:
DIT =
E(WInflationTargeting)   E(W Optimal)
E(W Optimal)
 100 (23)
where WInflationTargeting and WOptimal are the welfare loss in terms of steady state consump-
tion under optimal in￿ation targeting rule and the optimal commitment rule, respectively.
When both sectors have the same price setting mechanism, the optimal in￿ation target-
ing rule coincides with the optimal commitment rule as is the case in the models without
persistence. As far as nonuniform price setting mechanisms are concerned, the welfare
loss is less than one percent when both sectors do not display in￿ation persistence. In
other words, when the fraction of backward indexing price setters in the second sector
is 0.01 and the degree of in￿ation persistence in both sectors is close to zero, optimal
19in￿ation targeting policy approximates the optimal policy well. However, the welfare cost
increases as the fraction of backward indexing producers in the second sector increases.
Optimal in￿ation targeting policy implies an additional welfare loss as high as 7.5% when
the fraction of backward indexation is 0.8 and duration of prices is 6 quarters in the second
sector.
5.2 Welfare Analysis under Heterogenous Degrees of In￿ation
Persistence across Sectors
In this section, the welfare cost of optimal in￿ation targeting rule is considered relative to
the optimal rule according to the welfare measure (23) for a wide set of feasible calibra-
tions. Persistence of the ￿rst sector is calibrated to 0.1 and 0.3 points less than that of the
second sector, keeping this di￿erence constant. Therefore, as persistence in the second
sector increases that of ￿rst sector also increases. Thus, level of in￿ation persistence in
the economy as a whole increases.
The ￿rst panel of the Table 3 displays the extra welfare loss resulting from optimal in￿a-
tion targeting as a percentage of the optimal loss when the degree of in￿ation persistence
in the second sector is 0.1 point higher than that of the ￿rst sector. Optimal in￿ation
targeting rule approximates the optimal policy best when the duration of price and the
fraction of backward looking price setters in the second sector are lowest. The percentage
welfare loss increases as the average duration of prices and the fraction of backward look-
ing price setters increases. That is, keeping the fraction of backward indexing producers
in the second sector at 0.3, when duration of prices in the ￿rst sector is 3 quarters, the
percentage loss increases from 1.96 to 3.16, 4.33 and 5.39 as the duration of prices in the
second sector increases from 3 quarters to 4, 5 and 6 quarters. Similarly, keeping the av-
erage duration of prices at 3 quarters in both sectors, as the fraction of backward looking
price setters in the second sector increases from 0.3 to 0.55 and 0.8, the percentage welfare
loss increases from 1.96 to 4.34 and 20.76.
20Note that, higher duration of prices and higher fraction of backward looking price set-
ters have di￿erent implications for the level of the in￿ation persistence. Higher duration
implies lower degree of in￿ation persistence, whereas higher fraction of backward looking
price setters implies a higher degree of in￿ation persistence for both sectors. Therefore,
it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the relevance of the level of in￿ation
persistence in the economy for the welfare loss resulting from optimal in￿ation targeting.
Instead of the level of in￿ation persistence in the economy, its source is relevant for welfare.
Second panel of the Table 3 presents the welfare loss when second sector is 0.3 points more
persistent than the ￿rst sector. Similar to the results in the ￿rst panel, optimal in￿ation
targeting policy fails to approximate the optimal commitment rule and the welfare loss
does not increase as the level of persistence increases. The welfare loss increases as the
fraction of backward indexing producers in the second sector increases and implies almost
as high as twice the welfare loss under optimal rule when D2 = 6, D1 = 5,  2 = 0:8 and
 1 is 0.19.
Another interesting ￿nding is that, for a given calibration of frequency of price change in
both sectors and fraction of backward indexing price setters in the second sector, as the
di￿erence in the degree of in￿ation persistence across sectors increases the welfare loss
also increases. To illustrate, for D2 = 4 and  2 = 0:8 the degree of in￿ation persistence
in the second sector is 0.5. Keeping D1 = 3 and calibrating the ￿rst sector so that the
persistence is equal to 0.5, 0.4 and 0.2 implies additional welfare losses of 3.153, 24.70 and
56.35 percent, respectively. Therefore, it appears that as the degree of in￿ation persistence
di￿erential across sectors increases, optimal in￿ation targeting rule implies higher welfare
losses when compared to the optimal commitment policy.
5.3 Impulse Responses to Negative Supply Shock
To gain the intuition of these results, Figures 3 to 5 display the responses of the sectoral
in￿ations and output gaps, which is the deviation of the actual output from its natural
21rate, to a negative supply shock to the second sector. Following a negative supply shock,
the production in the second sector decreases and in￿ation of the second sector increases.
As the reduction in the production is less than the change in the natural rate of output of
the second sector, output gap increases in the second sector. Due to income e￿ect of the
higher price of the second sector’s product, demand for both sectors’ products decreases.
Decrease in the demand for the ￿rst sector good decreases the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector
and produces negative output gap since the natural rate of output is constant for the ￿rst
sector.
The implications of the magnitude of the di￿erential in sectoral in￿ation persistence can
be analyzed by comparing the responses in the three panels of the Figures 3 to 5. The ￿rst
panel of Figure 3 displays the impulse responses when both sectors have same the degree
of in￿ation persistence and the second and third panels display the responses when the
second sector is 0.1 points and 0.3 points more persistent than the ￿rst sector, respectively.
In the ￿rst panel, responses under optimal in￿ation targeting rule approximates that of
the optimal commitment rule well. However, as the di￿erence between the persistence of
sectoral in￿ations increases, the responses under optimal in￿ation targeting rule diverges
from those of the optimal rule. Therefore, the welfare loss relative to the optimal loss
increases as the degree of in￿ation persistence di￿erential increases.
Similar to Figure 3, Figures 4 and 5 show that as the sectors diverge in terms of degree
of in￿ation persistence, optimal in￿ation targeting regime fails to approximate the opti-
mal commitment rule and implies signi￿cant di￿erences in terms of responses of sectoral
in￿ations and output gaps.
As far as the implications of higher level of in￿ation persistence are concerned, the anal-
ysis can be done by comparing each impulse response across ￿gures. The relevance of
the level of in￿ation persistence in the overall economy can be analyzed by comparing
the impulse responses in Figure 4 to those of Figures 3 and 5. In￿ation persistence in
22the second sector is 0.43, 0.4 and 0.52 in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 , respectively.
The source of higher persistence in Figure 3 is higher frequency of price change, whereas
in￿ation persistence is higher in Figure 5 as the fraction of backward looking price setters
is higher than the one in Figure 3. The impulse responses in all three panels of the Figure
3 provide slightly better approximations to the optimal responses than the ones in the less
persistent economy, namely Figure 4. Therefore, when the source of higher persistence
in the economy is the increased frequency of price change, depending on the parameter
calibrations, a higher persistence may imply a higher or lower additional cost of adopting
optimal in￿ation targeting.
However, impulse responses in the Figure 5 deviates signi￿cantly more from the deviation
observed between the impulse responses in Figure 4. Therefore, if the higher persistence
is resulting from a higher fraction of backward looking price setters, optimal in￿ation
targeting policy produces impulse responses that deviates more from the those under the
optimal rule when in￿ation persistence in the economy is higher.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I extend the models existing in the literature in order to introduce in￿a-
tion persistence into two sectors and analyze the relevance of the in￿ation persistence for
the optimal in￿ation targeting policy design. I show that even if the sectoral in￿ations
have the same degree of persistence, optimal in￿ation targeting policy attaches di￿erent
weights to them unless they are characterized by equal frequency of price change and
fraction of backward looking price setters.
The main contribution of this paper is the ￿nding that the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule does not always attach a higher weight to the in￿ation of the more persistent sector.
Rather, the optimal weight is determined by the relative ￿atness of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. That is, the weight attached to a sector is higher when the sector has a
￿atter NKPC than the other sector.
23The welfare implications of the optimal in￿ation targeting policy are analyzed using a loss
function that is produced as a second order approximation to the utility function. The
results show that in contrast to the models without in￿ation persistence, in this model,
optimal in￿ation targeting policy fails to approximate the optimal commitment rule. I
di￿erentiate between the sources of higher in￿ation persistence in the economy and show
that if the persistence is resulting from a higher fraction of backward looking price setters,
the performance the optimal in￿ation targeting rule decreases. However, if the source of
higher in￿ation persistence is lower duration of prices, the extra welfare loss implied by
optimal in￿ation targeting decreases as in￿ation persistence increases.
As far as the relevance of the magnitude of the heterogeneity is concerned, as the di￿er-
ence between the degree of in￿ation persistence increases, the welfare loss implied by the
optimal in￿ation targeting policy increases. Therefore, optimal in￿ation targeting policy
may not be an appropriate policy when the in￿ation persistence di￿erential across sectors
is high.
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A. Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
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This equation can be recursively written as follows
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^ st+k is obtained by loglinearizing the equation (13) in the text















where loglinearizing the demand condition (7)
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27plugging this back to (A.6)


















































Next, loglinearization of price indices (14)-(16) and the demand condition (5) produce the fol-
lowing identities:
^ xb
i;t = ^ x
t 1   i;t + i;t 1 (A.9)
^ p
t 1 = (1    i)^ x
f
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f
t +  ^ xb
t)) (A.11)
^ Yi;t =  ^ xi;t + ^ Yt (A.12)
Combining the equations (A.8)-(A.12)produce the New Keynesian Phillips curve (18) in the text.
B.Derivation of the Loss Function
In this section I derive the utility based loss function for the model. The period t welfare of the











First, a ￿rst order Taylor series approximation is taken for the ￿rst term of the equation
Ut(d
t Yt/2) = UY1(Y1;t    Y1) + UY2(Y2;t    Y2) +
1
2




UY2Y2(Y2;t    Y2)2 + UY1Y2(Y1;t    Y1)(Y2;t    Y2)
+UdY1(d
t    d)(Y1;t    Y1) + UdY2(d
t    d)(Y2;t    Y2) + t:i:p + O(3)
where UYi  @U=@Yi and UYiYi  @2U=@Yi
2.  Y1and  Y2 are the optimal equilibrium levels of
output of sectors and  d is the steady state value of the identical demand shock. Using the fact
28that Yi =  Yi;t(1 + ^ Yi;t + 1
2 ^ Yi;t
2
) + O(3), (2) can be written as:
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 d  Y2 ^ d
t^ Y2;t + t:i:p + O(3)
where ^ Yi;t  log(Yi;t= Y ). A second order approximation to the second and the third terms of (1)
and similar manipulations give the following expression
(s
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yi  Yi^ yi;t(z) +
1
2
(yi  Yi + yiyi  Yi
2)^ yi;t(z)2 (B.4)
+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=@yi, yiyi  @2=@yi
2 and ^ yt(z)  log(yt(z)= Y ).  s
i is the steady state value
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Here Ez[] and varz[] represent the population average and variance of the outputs of the pro-
ducers, respectively. A Taylor series expansion of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (3) is given by
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2 )varz[^ y2;t(z)] + t:i:p: + O(3):
Notice that 2UYi = yi since the approximation is around e￿cient steady state and linear terms
cancel out.
In order to write (8) in terms of natural rates, the following relationships are
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0 and  =  U00  d  C=U0. Therefore, the third and the fourth terms in (8)
can be written as:
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The variance of the sectoral outputs can be written as variance of the prices of the di￿eren-
30tiated of products in each sector by utilizing the demand condition (7)as follows:
varz[^ yi;t(z)] = 2varz[logpi;t(z)] + O(3) (B.11)
By the de￿nition of variance
varz[logpi;t(z)] = Ez[logpi;t(z)2]   (Ez[logpi;t(z)])2
Since Ez[logpi;t 1(z)] is a constant in terms of z this can also be written as follows, which gives
the price dispersion in each sector:
varz[logpi;t(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1]] = Ez[(logpi;t(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1])2] (B.12)
 (Ez[logpi;t(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1]])2
Using the evolution of the aggregate price level of each sector the square root of second term in
(12)can be written as:
Ez[logpi;t(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1]] = iEz[logpi;t 1   Ez[logpi;t 1]] (B.13)
+(1   i)(1    i)(logp
f
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+(1   i) i(logpb
i;t   Ez[logpi;t 1])
= (1   i)(logp
i;t   Ez[logpi;t 1])
The ￿rst term in equation (12) can be rewritten as:
Ez[logpi;t(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1]]2 = iEz[logpi;t 1(z)   Ez[logpi;t 1]]2 + (B.14)
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Ez[logpi;t(z)] = logPi;t + O(2)
The second and the third terms in (14) can be further expressed as
logpb
i;t   Ez[logpi;t 1] = logp
i;t 1 + i;t 1 + logPi;t 1 + O(2) (B.15)
= logp
i;t 1 + logPi;t 2 + O(2)
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Finally by plugging (15)and (16) back to (14)







(1   i)(1    i)
2
i;t + O(3)
Solving this equation forward, starting with an initial variance of the prices, varz[logpi; 1(z)],
































+ t:i:p: + O(3)
32The equation (10) can be further developed using the following relations




UY1Y1  Y 2











UY1Y2  Y1 Y2 =
1
8




y1y1  Y 2
















































































)U0 Y varz[^ y2;t(z)] + t:i:p: + O(3):
Adding and subtracting 1
4U0 Y ( 1
2 + 1
2 + 1

































































1;t + ^ Y 2
2;t   2^ Y1;t^ Y2;t)


















33Substitution of these together with adding and subtracting ^ Y n
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)(varz[^ y1;t(z)] + varz[^ y2;t(z)]) + t:i:p: + O(3)
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)(varz[^ y1;t(z)] + varz[^ y2;t(z)])

+ t:i:p: + O(3)
The last term is
1 X
t=0





















































1;t   ^ Y2;t)   (^ Y 2








































(1   2)(1    2)
2
2;t) + t:i:p: + O(3)
De￿ne central bank loss function Lt as Wt =  1
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Table 1(a): Optimal Weights attached to the In￿ation of the First Sector under uniform
Degree of In￿ation Persistence across Sectors
 2
D2 D1 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 0.500 0.500 0.500
4 0.622 0.622 0.628
5 0.704 0.705 0.714
6 0.762 0.763 0.773
4 3 0.378 0.378 0.375 0.343
4 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
5 0.591 0.591 0.594
6 0.661 0.661 0.665
5 3 0.296 0.296 0.292 0.257
4 0.409 0.409 0.407 0.388
5 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
6 0.574 0.574 0.576
6 3 0.238 0.238 0.233 0.201
4 0.339 0.339 0.336 0.312
5 0.426 0.426 0.425 0.412
6 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The values are  in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule (22).
Table 1(b): Welfare Cost of In￿ation Targeting under uniform Degree of In￿ation
Persistence across Sectors
 2
D2 D1 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.105 0.208 0.485
5 0.326 0.651 1.529
6 0.596 1.178 2.750
4 3 0.104 0.186 0.369 3.153
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.071 0.121 0.236
6 0.242 0.405 0.773
5 3 0.324 0.554 1.022 5.622
4 0.071 0.116 0.209 1.239
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.054 0.082 0.143
6 3 0.595 0.974 1.719 7.532
4 0.242 0.375 0.640 2.922
5 0.054 0.082 0.135 0.624
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The welfare loss is computed according to (23).
35Table 2(a): Optimal Weights attached to the In￿ation of the First Sector when Second
Sector’s In￿ation is 0.1 points higher
 2
D2 D1 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 0.461 0.432 0.301
4 0.582 0.552 0.417
5 0.666 0.638 0.510
6 0.728 0.702 0.585
4 3 0.344 0.319 0.212
4 0.459 0.430 0.297
5 0.549 0.517 0.372
6 0.619 0.587 0.439
5 3 0.267 0.247 0.163
4 0.371 0.344 0.228
5 0.457 0.425 0.286
6 0.528 0.495 0.341
6 3 0.213 0.196 0.131
4 0.305 0.281 0.182
5 0.385 0.355 0.228
6 0.454 0.420 0.273
D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The values are  in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule (22).
Table 2(b): Optimal Weights attached to the In￿ation of the First Sector when Second
Sector’s In￿ation is 0.3 points higher
 2
D2 D1 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 0.410 0.354 0.094
4 0.527 0.458 0.137
5 0.611 0.537 0.185
6 0.674 0.599 0.235












D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The values are  in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule (22).
36Table 3(a): Welfare Cost of In￿ation Targeting when Second Sector’s In￿ation is 0.1
points higher
 2
D2 D1 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 1.96 4.34 20.76
4 1.52 3.41 15.67
5 1.17 2.62 11.80
6 0.93 2.00 8.96
4 3 3.16 6.46 24.70
4 2.62 5.59 21.72
5 2.18 4.78 18.87
6 1.85 4.09 16.40
5 3 4.33 8.35 27.74
4 3.77 7.59 26.05
5 3.26 6.80 23.91
6 2.86 6.10 21.80
6 3 5.39 9.98 30.30
4 4.86 9.37 29.62
5 4.32 8.64 28.06
6 3.86 7.94 26.27
D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The values are  in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule (22).
Table 3(b): Welfare Cost of In￿ation Targeting when Second Sector’s In￿ation is 0.3
points higher
 2
D2 D1 0.3 0.5 0.8
3 3 11.38 21.48 51.79
4 11.97 23.23 53.47
5 12.00 23.72 53.97
6 11.79 23.57 53.76












D2 is the duration of prices in the second sector and D1 is that of the ￿rst sector.  2 is the fraction of
backward looking price setters in the second sector. The values are  in the optimal in￿ation targeting
rule (22).
37Figure 1: Di￿erence in Serial Correlation in Sectoral In￿ations
(a)The di￿erence in serial correlations, i, as a function of the di￿erence in the coe￿cients of the lagged
in￿ation in the sectoral NKPCs, i2. Duration of price is 3 quarters and fraction of backward looking
price setters is 0.5 in the second sector and duration of price is 3 quarters in the ￿rst sector.
(b)The di￿erence in serial correlations, i, as a function of the di￿erence in the coe￿cients of the lagged
in￿ation in the sectoral NKPCs, i2. Duration of price is 3 quarters and fraction of backward looking
price setters is 0.5 in the second sector and duration of price is 4 quarters in the ￿rst sector.
38Figure 2: Optimal Weight and Relative Slope of the NKPC
The optimal weight attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector as a function of the relative slope of the
sectoral NKPCs for the cases when the di￿erential in degree of in￿ation persistence is 0, 0.1 and 0.3
points and fraction of backward looking producers is 0.5.
39Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector
Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector for the cases that both
sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence, second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by
0.1 points and second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by 0.3 points. D2 = 3, D1 = 3 and
 2= 0.5. The optimal weights attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector in the in￿ation targeting rule
are 0.5, 0.432 and 0.354 and optimal in￿ation targeting implies 0, 4.34 and 21.48 percent loss when the
di￿erence between the degree of in￿ation persistence across sectors is 0, 0.1 and 0.3 points, respectively.
40Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector
Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector for the cases that both
sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence, second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector
by 0.1 points and second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by 0.3 points. D2 = 4, D1 = 3
and  2= 0.5. The optimal weights attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector in the in￿ation targeting
rule are 0.378, 0.319 and 0.261 and optimal in￿ation targeting implies 0.369, 6.46 and 25.19 percent loss
when the di￿erence between the degree of in￿ation persistence across sectors is 0, 0.1 and 0.3 points,
respectively.
41Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector
Impulse response functions to a negative supply shock to the second sector for the cases that both
sectors have same degree of in￿ation persistence, second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by
0.1 points and second sector is more persistent than the ￿rst sector by 0.3 points. D2 = 4, D1 = 3 and
 2= 0.8. The optimal weights attached to the in￿ation of the ￿rst sector in the in￿ation targeting rule
are 0.343, 0.212 and 0.057 and optimal in￿ation targeting implies 3.153, 24.70 and 56.35 percent loss
when the di￿erence between the degree of in￿ation persistence across sectors is 0, 0.1 and 0.3 points,
respectively.
42